Tuesday, November 5, 2019

Spanish Verbs for Trying

Spanish Verbs for Trying To try is one of those English verbs that will steer you down the wrong path if you try to translate it with just one Spanish verb. This lesson looks at the most common ways of expressing the idea of trying and related phrases such as to try to or to try out. Fast Facts Tratar de and intentar are are the most common ways of translating try when it means to attempt something.Esforzarse and phrases using esfuerzo can also be used to emphasize the effort given.When try refers to a testing or testing out, the preferred translation is usually probar. Trying as Attempting When try means attempt, it can usually be translated as tratar de or intentar followed by an infinitive. The two are roughly synonymous, although tratar de is more common. Note that intentar is a false friend to the English verb to intend - intentar involves an actual attempt, not a mere intent as the English verb does. Tratamos de hacer lo mejor para conseguir el objetivo. (We are trying to do what is best in order to reach the objective.)Trataron de resucitar al cantante durante ms de una hora en el hospital. (They tried to resuscitate the singer for more than an hour in the hospital.)Trataremos de resolver sus problemas. (We will try to resolve your problems.)Vamos a tratar de ganar el campeonato. (We are going to try to win the championship.)Intentamos resolver las dudas que puedan surgir. (We are trying to resolve the doubts that may arise.)Intentar es major que esperar. (Trying is better than waiting.)Me intentaron hacer un fraude. (They tried to commit a fraud against me.)Intento comprender la verdad. (I am trying to understand the truth.) Trying as Testing When to try means to test, as the phrase to try out often does, you can often use the verb probar: Probamos algo nuevo. (Were trying something new.)Los estudiantes probaron comidas de los diferentes paà ­ses. (The students tried meals of different countries.)Los terroristas probaban gases venenosos experimentando con perros. (The terrorists tried out poisonous gases by experimenting with dogs.)Me probà © la camisa y vi que estaba hecha exactamente a mi medida. (I tried on the shirt and saw that it was made exactly to my size.)Desde que probà © su consejo, mi vida cambià ³ para siempre. (Ever since I tried her advice, my life has been forever changed.)Pues, pruà ©balo y vers. (Here, try it out and youll see.)Voy a probar un nuevo truco de magia. (Im going to try a new magic trick.)Probà © suerte de nuevo y abrà ­ mi propio negocio. (I tried my luck again and opened my own business.) Trying as an Effort To try in the sense of put forth an effort can often be translated as esforzarse or a phrase such as hacer un esfuerzo por. Although intentar and tratar de can also indicate an effort, they put less emphasis on it than do esforzarse and phrases using esfuerzo. Sà © que puedes esforzarte ms. (I know you can try harder.)Me esfuerzo con toda intensidad por ser sincero. (Im trying as hard as I can to be honest.)Pero yo me esfuerzo todo lo que puedo. (Im trying to do everything I can.)Hago un esfuerzo por  apartar de mi mente lo ocurrido y concentrarme en mi trabajo. (Im trying to get my mind off of what happened and concentrate on my work.)Volvià ³ al sillà ³n e  hizo un esfuerzo por  relajarse.  (She returned to the rocking chair and tried to relax.)Es necesario hacer un esfuerzo. (It is necessary to try.) Legal Use of 'Try' To try in the sense of to put on trial can be expressed by procesar or juzgar: El juez procesà ³ ayer a ocho personas por el robo de armas de guerra. The judge yesterday tried eight people for the theft of military weapons.Juzgaron a los activistas de Greenpeace en Espaà ±a. The Greenpeace activists were tried in Spain. 'Try' as a Noun Try as a noun can often be translated well using intento: Haz de nuevo el intento. Give it another try. ¡Al menos hicieron  su mejor intento! At least they gave it their best try!Al menos resulta un intento divertido. (At least it was a fun try.)

Saturday, November 2, 2019

Global Macroeconomic Imbalances as the cause of the crisis Essay

Global Macroeconomic Imbalances as the cause of the crisis - Essay Example This assignment seeks to present the various views of researchers with regards to the fact whether the micro-economic imbalance account for the main cause behind the crisis. The economic researchers have been increasingly involved in providing the basis and context for the occurring of the global financial crisis. Richard Portes have been particularly active in the media for his research on the origin as well as the implications of the recent credit crunch in the world economy. Richard has identified the main root and origin of the financial crisis as the world’s macro-economic imbalances which were responsible for bringing about huge inflow of capital across borders. This phenomenon was particularly overwhelming for the sophisticated financial systems present in the United States and the United Kingdom which was consequently responsible for the creation of asset price bubbles. This was also responsible for provoking ‘search for yield’ which with the support of th e credit rating agencies resulted in the creation of ‘toxic assets’ in the economy. Moreover during the break of the crisis coordination from the Central Bank was inadequate or not sufficient. This was considered to the main reason behind according to inference of Richard Roberts. He has also proposed a suitable solution to the problem as identified as above. His suggestion to the world economy was to deal with the macro-economic imbalances and also the remove the weaknesses of financial regulatory system. According to him the combined impact of the two solutions simultaneously would be the solution to the financial crisis (London Business School, 2008, p.1). Critical Assessment Following are some of the findings of the London Business School. The Russian Default occurring in August 1998 and the near death experience of LTCM was one of the main causes of imbalance in the financial markets. There were pervasive fears across the global economy during the month of Septembe r in the same year and by the beginning of October the US Treasury became liquid to a certain extent. This resulted in the fall in the dollar by about 15% in relation to the Yen in three

Thursday, October 31, 2019

MEMO REPORT(WAGE NEGOTIATIONS Incident Decision) Assignment

MEMO REPORT(WAGE NEGOTIATIONS Incident Decision) - Assignment Example The union has made it clear that if their demands are not met the employees will go on strike. The firm should avoid the strike scenario under all consequences. The proposed solution avoids the risk of a work stoppage caused by a worker’s strike. The optimal solution for the company is to settle with the union in order to resolve the incident. The negotiator send to talk will admit that the employees deserve a raise. The negotiator will explain to the union representatives that the increase in production of the company came due to a variety of factors including better equipment, optimal use of technology, and mastering the learning curve. The human factor also contributed directly to the increment in production. The firm will open its books to show the union that the company cannot afford such a high increment in salary. The proposed solution is to offer the employees an increase of $400 per

Tuesday, October 29, 2019

Non profit organizations Article Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Non profit organizations - Article Example The main priority which is laid while performing the broad duties mostly reflects upon determining the interests of the law. Also, the duties that perform by high rank officers are framed in such a way that demonstrates legal forms of working behavior. However, the main concern in such type of organization is to generate a balanced working atmosphere. This particular aspect is developed through executing various principles related to corporate governance in non-profit organizations. The best feature about this sort of organization is that all the officers along with other employees perform their respective assigned tasks quite effectively. Also, the duties of officers in a non-profit organization are determined through following a broader framework which considers the basic objectives of such type of organizations. This way, the broad duties along with the responsibilities of all the members including the officers get prioritized in a formative manner (Twaits, 1998). This paper will broadly consider the major aspects pertaining to the broad duties of officers along with employees in non-profit organizations. In addition, the aspects will be critically analyzed, backed up with a proper review and a personal reflection of the concerned article. Review of the Item As per the studies undertaken by Andrew Twaits (1998), numerous researches and surveys have been conducted upon managing the non-profit organizations (NPOs) belonging to this modern day context. With increased level of globalization along with internationalization, NPOs have been viewed to support the community members in terms of serving their best interests effectively. It has been learned that NGOs can very well move in aligning with the needs of the society by a certain degree. With due analysis, it can be stated that the different activities of NPOs have been able to widen the expectation levels of shareholders in terms of fulfilling their respective desires. The management along with the operationa l activities that takes place in a NPO and the duties perform by the officers as well as the employees is often recognized to be quite broad. It can be apparently observed that the different tasks and the duties that are performed by the officers along with the employees deliver a high range of performance within the organizations. According to the article, it can be viewed that there exist two sorts of organization that mainly comprise ‘unincorporated association’ and ‘incorporated association’. These associations eventually lead towards governing along leading NPOs to attain their predetermined targets. In this regard, the term ‘unincorporated association’ signifies the meaning of a chamber, club, federation, society, council, league, institute, union or guild, which is fundamentally voluntary in nature. This form of association is viewed to serve the basic purpose or serving the interests of a group of people. The other form of association i .e. ‘incorporated association’ is regarded as a form of association which can be understood as a legal entity that possesses a perpetual succession and also a common seal. This form of association is considered to be highly recognizable in nature. This particular association is formed with the intent of considering all the legal attributes that are needed to be fulfilled while forming an ‘incorporated association’. Strong approval from the government is required for the formation of such

Sunday, October 27, 2019

Review of the literature on risk management

Review of the literature on risk management This chapter reviews the literature on the risk management and corporate governance in the banking sector. Part of the literature also attempts to provide a relationship between the independence and financial knowledge of the board of directors and audit committee, and risk management practices by referring to both empirical and analytical research. 2.1 Risk Management in the banking sector When discussing the challenges faced by financial institutions in managing risk, it is important to have a consistent definition of the term risk. Risk can be defined as the volatility of a corporations market value. Risk management involves the protection of a firms assets and profits. Moreover, not only does it provide profitability but also other advantages like being in line with obedience function toward the rule, increasing the firms reputation and opportunity to attract more customers in building their portfolio of fund resources. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) suggest that [à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦] the benefits of advances in risk management in banking may be greater credit availability, rather than reduced risk in the banking system (p.19). This means that banks will have a greater opportunity to increase their productive assets and profit. Only those banks that have efficient risk management system will survive in the market in the long run. They can follow a four-step routine to red uce their risk exposures and achieve their risk management objectives, as shown below. Figure 1-Steps for implementing risk management To properly manage risks, banks must firstly identify and classify the sources from which risk may arise at both transaction and portfolio levels. Risks inherent in lending activities include market risk, liquidity risk, credit risk and operational risk. Market risk is the risk resulting from adverse movements in the level of market prices of equities, currencies, interest rate instruments and commodities. Banks are always facing the risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising from undesirable market movements. Banks are inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk due to their fundamental role of transforming of short-term deposits into long-term loans. The FSA has defined liquidity risk as: The risk that a firm, though solvent, either does not have sufficient financial resources available to enable it to meet its obligations as they fall due, or can secure them only at an excessive cost. Another risk that banks face is credit risk. It is the risk that can be incurred if the counterparty fails to meet its obligations in a timely manner. Loans are the most palpable source of credit risk in many of the banking systems; however, other sources of this risk originate through other activities of banks such as acceptances, trade financing, interbank transactions, financial futures, foreign exchange transactions, swaps, equities, options, bonds, and in the extension of commitments and guarantees, and the settlement of transactions. Operational risk, as its name suggests, is a risk arising from execution of a companys business functions. The Basel Committee has defined operational risk as: the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or external events, such as the failure of computer systems or error and fraud on the part of staff. Apart from those risks mentioned above, the Federal Reserve System has also recognised two other risks: legal risk and reputational risk. Legal risk is the risk of loss caused by sanctions or penalties originating from court disputes due to breach of contract and legal obligation. Another legal risk relates to regulatory risk, i.e., the risk of loss resulting from sanctions and penalties pronounced by a regulatory body. Reputational risk may be defined as the risk of loss caused by a negative impact on the market positioning of the bank. It can be seen as the blowing up of an initial loss, arising from credit, market, liquidity or operational risks. However, banks hardly pay attention to these categories of risks. Once identified, the risks should be evaluated to determine their impact on the companys profitability and capital. This entails measuring them by using various techniques ranging from simple to sophisticated ones. For example, market risk can be measured by using Value at Risk. This stage also calls for estimating three dimensions of each exposure: the potential frequency of losses that exposures have produced or may produce, the potential impact on the organisation if a loss should occur and the potential variation in losses that will occur during the exposure period. Accurate and timely measurement of risk is necessary because with these types of data the risk manager can determine which exposes are most serious and which deserve the most immediate attention. After measuring risk, bank managers should establish and communicate risk limits through policies, standards, and procedures that define responsibility and authority. These limits should serve as a means to control the risks associated with the banking institutions activities. There is a variety of mitigating tools that banks may employ to minimise the loss exposures. These tools may be diversification, securitization and even derivative such as withdrawal option, Bermudan-style return put option, return swap, return swaption and liquidity option. The final step involves appraising the operation of the program regularly to be sure that it is achieving planned results. It helps the managers to evaluate the wisdom of their decision-making. To efficiently monitor risk, all material risk exposures should be identified and measured again. To facilitate this procedure, banks should put in place an effective management information system (MIS) that will provide directors and senior managers with timely reports on the operating performance, financial condition and risk exposure of the firm. If corrective action is indicated at this stage, the first three steps should be repeated. 2.1 Corporate Governance in the banking sector Corporate governance is a term that is now universally invoked wherever business and finance are discussed. Its purpose is to coordinate a conflict of interest among all parties relationship within the company and to develop a system that can reduce or eliminate the agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control (OECD, 1997). Agency problem occurs when the agents of an organization (e.g. management) use their power to satisfy their own interests rather than those of the principals (e.g. shareholders). It may also refer to simple disagreement between agents and principals. For example, the board of directors may disagree with shareholders on how to best invest the companys assets, especially when the board of directors wishes to invest in securities that would favour their interests. Not merely does the term corporate governance carries different interpretations, its analysis also involves diverse disciplines and approaches. One of the most quoted definitions of corporate governance is the one given by Shleifer and Vishny (1997): corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assures themselves of getting a return on their investment. The Cadbury Report, however, defined corporate governance as the system by which companies are directed and controlled (para 2.5). Additionally, it recognised that a system of good governance allows the board of directors to be free to drive their companies forward, but exercise that freedom within a framework of effective accountability (para 1.1). The Hampel Report, whilst accepting the Cadbury definition of corporate governance, also noted that the single overriding objective of companies is the preservation and the greatest practical enhancement over time of their shareholders investment ( para 1.16). In a similar vein, Charkham (1994) identified two basic principles of corporate governance: That management must be able to drive the enterprise forward free from undue constraint caused by government interference, fear of litigation, or fear of displacement. That this freedom- to use managerial power or patronage- must be exercised with a framework of effective accountability. Nominal accountability is not enough. In the banking sector, however, corporate governance differs greatly with other economic sectors in terms of broader extent of claimants the banks assets and funds. In manufacturing corporations, the issue is to maximise the shareholders value but in banking, the risk involved for depositors assumes greater importance due to the fact that almost every bit of banks investment are financed by the depositors funds. If it goes bankrupt, it will be depositors savings that the bank will lose. Indeed, Macey and OHara (2001) states that a broader view of corporate governance should be adopted in the case of banking institutions, arguing that because of the peculiar contractual form of banking, corporate governance mechanisms for banks should encapsulate depositors as well as shareholders. Arun and Turner (2003) also support this argument. Furthermore, the involvement of government in the banking sector is discernibly higher compared to other economic sectors due to the larger interests of th e public (Caprio and Levine, 2002; Levine, 2004). Rational depositors require some form of guarantee before depositing their wealth in banks. Yet, it is relatively difficult for banks to provide these guarantees to them because communicating the value of a banks loan portfolio is quite impossible and very costly to reveal. As a consequence of this asymmetric information problem, bank managers can have an incentive to invest in riskier assets than they promised they would ex ante. To assure depositors that they will not expropriate them, banks could make investments in brand-name or reputational capital (Klein, 1974; Gorton, 1994; Demetz et al, 1996; Bhattacharya et al, 1998), but these schemes give depositors little confidence, especially when contracts have a finite nature and discount rates are sufficiently high (Hickson and Turner, 2003). The opaqueness of banks also makes it very costly for depositors to constrain managerial discretion through debt covenants (Capiro and Levine, 2002, p.2). As such, government interventions provide the lacking assurance to economic agents in the form of deposit insurance. Nevertheless, although the government provides deposit insurance, bank managers still have an incentive to opportunistically increase their risk-taking, but now it is mainly at the governments expense. Apart from supporting the argument that a broader approach to corporate governance should be adapted to banking institutions, Arun and Turner (2003) also argue that government intervention do restrain the behaviour of bank management. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has defined the governance in banks as the methods and approaches used to manage banks through the board of directors and senior management which determine how to put the banks objectives, operation and protect the interests of shareholders and stakeholders with a commitment to act in accordance with existing laws and regulations and to achieve the protection of the interests of depositors. The Table 1 below shows the general principles concerning corporate governance issued by the Basel Committee specifically for bank boards and senior management. Principle 1 Board members should be qualified for their positions, have a clear understanding of their role in corporate governance and be able to exercise sound judgment about the affairs of the bank. Principle 2 The board of directors should approve and oversee the banks strategic objectives and corporate values that are communicated throughout the banking organisation. Principle 3 The board of directors should set and enforce clear lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the organisation. Principle 4 The board should ensure that there is appropriate oversight by senior management consistent with board policy. Principle 5 The board and senior management should effectively utilise the work conducted by the internal audit function, external auditors, and internal control functions. Principle 6 The board should ensure that compensation policies and practices are consistent with the banks corporate culture, long-term objectives and strategy, and control environment. Principle 7 The bank should be governed in a transparent manner. Principle 8 The board and senior management should understand the banks operational structure, including where the bank operates in jurisdictions, or through structures, that impede transparency (i.e. know-your-structure). Table 1- Principles of corporate governance for bank boards and senior management 2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanism According to agency theory, the corporate governance mechanisms reduce the agency problem between investors and management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Gillan, 2006). Traditionally, these mechanisms can be classified as internal and external. Llewellyn and Sinha, (2000) states that internal corporate governance is about mechanism for the accountability, monitoring, and control of a firms management with respect to the use of resources and risk taking. Its main mechanisms are the board of directors, the ownership structure of the firm and the internal control system (Gillan, 2006). Whereas, external corporate governance controls encompass the controls external stakeholders exercise over the organisation and its primary external mechanisms are the takeover market and the legal/regulatory system. However for the purpose of this paper, we will mainly focus on some internal corporate governance mechanism such as the board of directors, more precisely on its independence and financial knowledge. Corporate governance best practices have also stressed in particular the key role played by the audit committee in reviewing a firms internal control system. Internal control systems contribute to the protection of shareholders interests by providing reasonable assurance on the reliability of financial reporting, effectiveness of operations and compliance with laws and regulations (COSO, 1994; 2004). As such, we will also draw some attention on the audit committee. 2.3 The boards independence The popular media as well as corporate governance experts have characterised boards largely as rubber stamps for management. They are the link between the shareholders of the firm and the managers entrusted with undertaking the day-to-day operations of the organisation (Monks and Minow, 1995; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). As stated in principle 4 above, bank boards should properly supervise the work of managers. Which type of directors can perform better this duty than independent director? In fact, such directors can bring additional experience as well as clarity of thought to deliberations independent of views of management. Moreover, since their careers are not tied to the firms CEO, outside directors are believed to be more powerful in keeping efficiently the firms top management (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and so could be associated with better performance. Some papers do support this theory. Baysinger and Butler (1985), being among the first studies, find that the relative independence of boards has a positive effect on the firms average return on equity by comparing 266 major US businesses over a ten-years period. Kesner (1987); Weisbach (1988); Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990); Peace and Zahra (1992); Ezzamel and Watson (1993); MacAvoy and Millstein (1999); Brown and Caylor (2004) and Ho (2005) also show that shareholder returns are enhanced by having a greater proportion of outside directors on the board. Research by Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) shows significantly higher returns to firms announcing poison pill  [1]  when outside directors dominate the board. Other studies supporting the benefit of the boards independence are Dechow and Sloan (1996); Beasely (1996) and Klein (2002) who state that as outside membership on the board increases the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases. There is also Black et al. (2006) who reports that firms with 50% outside directors have approximately 40% higher share price by studying 515 Korean firms. And more recently, Staikouras C. K., Staikouras P. K. and Agoraki M. K. (2006) find that the percentage of independent directors is positively related with performance measured by Tobins Q on a sample of European banks. On the other hand, others find no convincing evidence that the level of outside directors on the board do add value to corporate performance. For instance, Fosberg (1989) finds that firms whose board is composed of a majority of outside directors do not have a higher performance as measured by the firms ROE or sales. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find that non-executive directors have no impact on corporate performance in their sample of 142 NYSE firms. Pearce (1983) also find no relationship, as too Changanti et al. (1985) in their study of board composition and bankruptcy. The lack of relation between these two components has also been confirmed by Klein (1998), Bhagat and Black (2002) and Hayes, Mehran and Scott (2004). Other scholars refuting the effectiveness of outside directors on the board are Subrahmanyam et al. (1997) and Harford (2000) for the acquisition transactions, Core et al. (1999) for CEO compensation and Agrawal and Chadha (2005) for earnings restatements . It is normally the board of directors which overviews and approves the risk management policies. But, few papers have tried to link its independence to the firms risk management practices and hedging. By analysing a sample of bank holding companies, Whidbee and Wohar (1999) find that the likelihood of using derivatives seem to increase with the presence of external directors on the board but only when insiders hold a large proportion of the firms shares. Borokhovich et al. (2004) demonstrate that firms most active in hedging risk, especially when making use of interest rate derivatives usage, are those whose boards are dominated by external directors. Conversely, Dionne and Triki (2004); Mardsen and Prevost (2005) point out that outside directors has no impact on the firms risk management policy. Given the mixed empirical findings, it is quite difficult to assert whether the board independence contribute to corporate performance and the effectiveness of risk management. Although Fields and Keys (2003) assert that there is overwhelming support for independent directors providing superior monitoring and advisory functions to the firm, a unique and clear sign concerning the effect of the boards independence on any decision including the risk management one could not be predicted. 2.4 The financial knowledge of the board To adequately perform their supervision role, the board of directors must have financial knowledge  [2]  . Indeed, when board members are generalists and lack the technical financial knowledge to understand the complicated reports presented to them, they could vote for motions that increase the risks facing of the firm to a large extent. The company may collapse in this way and therefore hinder the shareholders interest. Because of the banks dominant position in the economy; they should possess some financial expertise directors on its board so as to make better decisions that will not lead the firm to go bankrupt. However, given its importance, the research on the value of the boards financial knowledge is quite scarce. At times, reports recognising the benefits of the boards independence also recommend financial literacy/expertise for directors in monitoring the firms performance. In fact, Booth and Deli (1999) and Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2004) suggest that commercial bankers on boards provide the financial skill needed to enable the business to contract more debt. Thus, this states that financial directors do add value to the firm. There is also Agrawal and Chadha (2005) who discover that there is lower earnings restatement in firms whose boards have accounting or financially knowledgeable independent directors. However, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) provide evidence that positive abnormal returns associated with the addition of an outsider to the board are higher when the latter is an officer of a financial firm. Later on, Lee, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1999) do come to the same conclusion. However, they were unable to make any statistically difference among the reaction of the three categories of financial directors they consider: commercial bankers, insurance company officers and investment bankers. To the best of our knowledge, researches on the boards financial knowledge have only been related with the firms performance and not specifically on its impact on risk management practices. As mentioned earlier in this study, the board of directors is usually responsible for the firms risk management policies. In other words, risk management is at the core of any board members charter. Financially knowledgeable directors will obviously make better decisions on risk management practices since they will have the technical background to understand the sophisticated tools involved in risk management transactions. As such, firms whose boards are composed of financially knowledgeable directors engage more actively in risk management. 2.5 The audit committee The audit committee is intended to provide a link between the board and the auditor independent of the companys management, which is responsible for the accounting system (IOD, 1995). The chief objectives of an audit committee are to improve the quality of financial reporting, to reduce the potential authority for the non-executive director, to improve the channel of communication with the external auditor and, perhaps most importantly, to review the adequacy of the companys financial control systems. Tricker (1984) defines audit committee as being an important vehicle for ensuring the supervision and accountability at board level. As such, audit committees are very important in banking to safeguard the shareholders interest as well as the public trust. Just as for the board of directors, independence is also considered important for an audit committee because outside directors can exercise their voice and be seen to make a valuable contribution since they are free of any influence arising from the firms CEO. Thus, the reported empirical evidence supports this argument. Klein (2002) shows that independent audit committees reduce the likelihood of earnings management, thus improving transparency. In addition, Abbott, Park and Parker (2002) argue that firms with audit committees comprising entirely of independent directors are less likely to have fraudulent or misleading reporting. Ho (2005) states that there is a strong positive link between independent audit committee and corporate competitiveness and also with return on equity after analyzing the international companies from 1997to 1999. Brown and Caylor (2004) do provide evidence that audit committees comprising of independent directors are positively related to dividend but not t o operating performance. On the other hand, some authors find a negative relationship or simply no relation at all between independent audit committee and the firms performance. Hayes, Mehran and Scott (2004) prove that the firms performance measured by the market to book ratio is not affected by the proportion of outside directors sitting on the audit committee. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) do come to the same conclusion by indicating that independent audit committee members are unrelated to earnings restatement. There are also Beasley (1996) who finds no apparent correlation between audit committees composition and financial statement fraud, and Klein (1998) who reports no relation between share prices and the audit committees composition. Yet, Carcello and Neal (2000) report a negative relationship between the probability of receiving a going-concern report and the proportion of outsiders on the audit committee. In addition to independence, the accounting and financial expertise of members of the audit committee has also received widespread attention from the media and regulators  [3]  . An audit committee with such characteristics is expected to provide effective monitoring as it possesses the skills needed to understand what is going on in the organisation. Interestingly, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) show that firms whose audit committees have an outside director with accounting background or financial knowledge are less likely to report earnings restatement while Abbott, Parker and Peters (2002) discover that the absence of a financially competent director on the audit committee is highly associated with an increased in financial misstatement and financial fraud. Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) find that the presence of investment bankers on the audit committee decreases discretionary accruals in a firm. Davidson et al. (2004) and Defond, Hann and Hu (2004) show that the market has a po sitive reaction following the announcement of directors with accounting /auditing experience on audit committees board. The audit committee is also responsible for evaluating the risk exposures and the measures taken to monitor and control these exposures. To our knowledge no paper has tried to link audit committees composition with risk management practices. Because of the mixed and conflicting argument on independence, it is quite difficult for us to attest whether audit committees independence encourage more corporate hedging. Furthermore, risk evaluation and risk management tools are quite difficult to use and thus understanding them requires a good grasp of mathematics and statistics. As such, we expect firms whose audit committees members are qualified as accounting/financial expert to engage more actively in risk management practices. Besides independence and accounting/financial knowledge, the Cadbury Report has insisted that all listed companies should have an audit committee comprising of at least three members. This is to urge firms to devote significant director resources to their audit committees so that audit committees monitor the firms management more efficiently. However, several studies support the idea that larger boards can be dysfunctional since they may be plagued with free rider, communication problem and monitoring problems  [4]  . Therefore, as long as the increase in the audit committees size does not pose these types of problems, firms complying with this requirement are expected to report a higher hedging ratio. Often, corporations, especially financial ones, create another committee named risk monitoring committees. This type of committee is often responsible of the risk monitoring of the firm. However, this does not imply that audit committee is no longer responsible for evaluating and managing risks. It must still discuss and evaluate risk management processes. In other words, the audit committee is there to review risk management processes proposed by the risk management committee. As such, we assume that the same characteristics as the audit committee should be applied to this type of committee to fulfil their duties well.

Friday, October 25, 2019

Story of a Different Hour :: Essays Papers

The Story of a Different Hour Mrs. Millard just found out that Mr. Millard was killed in a tragic train wreck. Because of a heart condition, Josephine (Mrs. Millard's sister) was hesitant to tell her what happened. Richard (Mr. Millard's good friend) was also there to comfort the newly widowed Mrs. Millard. Josephine was concerned for her sister. To everyone?s surprise Mrs. Millard was rather joyful rather than devastated of the tragic news about her husband. ?Free! Free! Free!?, ?Free! Body and free soul?. Everyone was a bit confused, why Louise was jumping for joy when she just received that her husband passed away few minutes ago. Something smells fishy in this story and who really is Richard? Is he a good friend of Mr. Millard or he is a lover of Louise?.. Well, we will modify some sentences in this story. We all knew what happened in the end. Mrs. Millard was having the time of her life because she just found out that her husband just died. Was Louise happy because of the hefty insurance money that her husband left her? We can?t tell. So as the door was being opened by a latchkey everyone ran through the long stair case and found ?Brently Millard who entered, a little travel-stained, composedly carrying his grip-sack and umbrella?, then Louise was so flabbergasted that she had a heart attack and eventually died. In my opinion the story could use a better ending than Louise dying at the end of the story. If only Chopin talked to me about this story before she published it in 1894 it would probably be a little different. We left of where before Brently opened the door. After Brently died, Louise was alone in her huge plantation. She asked Josephine to move in with her because she can?t bear to be alone any longer. One day Richard dropped by to check on Louise and to drop the title of the house, Richard is a prominent lawyer nowadays. Richard stayed for supper, and Louise told him ?

Thursday, October 24, 2019

Jewish, Early Christian, Byzantine and Islamic Art

Teri Wilson March 1, 2010 Professor Hollinger Module 5 JEWISH, EARLY CHRISTIAN, BYZANTINE AND ISLAMIC ART Every religion has its own approach to art and architecture. An assessment between different traditions can offer an illuminating insight into the varying religious outlooks and theologies. Architecture, as well as art, is influenced by a number of forces in society, in the environment, in the psychology of the people who produce it, and in different institutions. It is an expression of inner feelings and beliefs and so naturally is influenced by religion in many societies. Religious architecture is created to experience the sacred, to provide a place into which spiritual energies flow and reflect a sense of the divine. Some religions speak of art directly or have tenets which influence what can and cannot be depicted in art. The scriptures of these religions are the theological basis and shape the way people in express themselves, and this includes how they express themselves through art and architecture. The architecture in Judaism, Christianity, Byzantine, and Islam has important similarities and differences that are a result of the teachings of these faiths. In the first centuries C. E. , Jewish communities could be found in every corner of the Roman Empire. The archaeological remnants and literary attestations of more than 150 synagogues throughout the empire make clear that Jews were integral to the urban landscape of late antiquity, well beyond the borders of Roman Palestine. Asia Minor, in particular, was one of the most prosperous, Jewish communities (Stokstad, 164) The third-century synagogue in the Roman garrison town of Dura-Europos, Syria, like the Christian meeting house and the shrine devoted to the Persian god Mithras that stood just yards away, was adorned with sumptuous painting. The Wall of Torah Niche had splendid murals with narrative scenes from the Bible covered the synagogue's walls; painted tiles of zodiacal symbols ornamented its ceiling (Stokstad, 165). Plaques with dedicatory inscriptions give some indication of the individuals and families who funded the building of such synagogues. In building their monuments, Jews often embraced the Greco-Roman practice of paving the floor with elaborate mosaics, many of which demonstrate an understanding of the second commandment injunction against image making that may surprise today's viewer. In early Byzantine synagogues such as Hamman Lif in North Africa and Beth Alpha, Hammath Tiberias, and Sepphoris in Israel, specifically Jewish symbols—shofarot (ram's horns), menorot (branched lamps), and Torah shrines—might appear alongside pomegranates, birds, lions, and fountains (metmuseum. rg). Zodiac wheels with human figures also find a prominent place in the pavements of several synagogues, dated from the fourth to the sixth centuries, as do scenes drawn from the Bible or allegorized images of the River Nile. After the destruction of the Second Temple by Roman emperor Titus in 70 C. E—an event commemorated on the Arch of Titus in Rome and in Jewish liturgy—images of the Temple's furnishings, especia lly the celebrated gold menorah, or seven-branched lamp, became emblematic of Jewish religion. Marble sarcophagi favored by wealthy Romans were adapted for Jewish use by incorporating a stylized relief image of a menorah (metmuseum. org). In the catacombs of Rome, Jews placed gold glass disks representing the menorah and Torah arks at their tombs, as well as symbols of the festival of Sukkot just as Christians placed glass disks showing saints All these images reference the destroyed Temple and invoke a hoped-for messianic age when the Temple would be restored. So wide-ranging are the contexts for the menorot that it is clear the symbol frequently served merely to distinguish a Jewish monument or a Jewish patron. Seven-branched candlesticks appear in Roman and Byzantine art: in graffiti in the catacombs, inscribed on plaques, as a motif on seals, as decoration on glass bottles and on clay lamps all further testimony to the integration of Jews into late Roman and early Byzantine society (metmuseum. org). With the adoption of Christianity as the official religion, art was able, so to speak, to come above ground in the old pagan city of Rome, and painting, instead of being restricted to the decoration of the walls of the Catacombs or of small chambers and chapels, came into use on a large scale in the new churches that were at once set up. At the same time patronage moved from the hands of the poorer classes to the richer, and artists of outstanding quality came to be employed as well as those of obscurer character, who would work for small fees (www. religion-online. org). To wall painting was added the more luxurious art of mosaic; numerous sculptures were done, and minor objects, often in expensive materials, were in addition produced in the service of the Church, so that art production became at the same time both more extensive and more luxurious (www. religion-online. org ). A great deal of the work that was done at this time has of course perished, more especially that in fragile materials, such as textiles or paintings on panels, but a few mosaics of the fourth century and a good many more of the fifth survive in Rome, and there is quite a lot of sculpture, both on a large scale in stone and on a small in ivory. Something has already been said about the ivories, more especially the Consular diptychs, which necessarily form a part of the general picture, though it is not always easy to be sure of where they were made, as they are in a diversity of styles (www. eligion-online. org). Here we are concerned not so much with these things as with works which are essentially Christian and also undoubtedly Roman, such as the mosaics and wall painting, which are necessarily immovable or stone sculptures on a large scale in a material which was carved on the spot and quarried in the neighborhood. The earliest of the mosaics are those in the church of Sta Constanz a, which was built as an octagonal martyrium or tomb sanctuary between 306 and 337. It was converted into a baptistery in the fifth century, when the lateral apses were added. Only the mosaics on the roofs of the vaulted aisles are of the same date as the original building. This roof is divided into eight compartments, and there are different designs in each, though only those on the three sets on each side survive; they are in pairs, balancing one another on each side. These mosaics, which consist in the main of scrolls and other diverse motifs shown in isolation against a white ground, are very classical in character; they are virtually floor mosaics transferred to the roof. The mosaics which decorated the central dome have not survived, though there is a sixteenth century painting of them in the Escorial. They included scenes from the Old and New Testaments, bordered below by a river and separated one from another by caryatid figures, not unlike the dividing panels in the Baptistery of the Orthodox at Ravenna. In the apses which terminate the sides of the octagon to the north and south are figural compositions of a rather different character, depicting the â€Å"Traditio Legis†, where Christ conveys future responsibility for preaching on one side to Peter and on the other to Paul. Our Lord stands in the centre of each apse, with the Apostle before Him, against a background of trees (catholic-resources. org). The mosaics are probably to be assigned to the time of the building's conversion for use as a baptistery in the fifth century. They have, however, been very much restored at subsequent dates, and to-day appear somewhat clumsy (catholic-resources. org). Those in the dome probably belonged to the same date as those in the vaults of the octagon. Another similar church of this kind is the Church of Santa Sabrina, a fifth-century basilica in Rome. The basilica, constructed by Bishop Peter of IIyria between 422 and 432 BC, is another must see (Stokstad, 170). Santa Sabrina, exterior is typical of the time, which is severe brickwork. In contrast, the interior displays a wealth of marble veneer and 24 fluted marble columns with Corinthian capitals acquired from a 2nd century building (Stokstad, 170). Christianity subject matter is the prime source of art up to the modern era. We find religious art in all styles and the major artists used Christianity in most of their paintings and built structures for Christian churches. In conclusion, it can be seen that art is not just one thing. It is a combination of devices which have taken thousands of years to grow and develop, through different religions, and through time. I personally feel that art is not something that we can define or even begin to describe. Art is to much a part of life to single out on its own or define, especially, religious art. Trying to write a summary on a general view of what art is is virtually impossible. Art, inside of every person is seen as something different and unique making the definition of art diversified for every person. Works Cited 1. www. metmuseum. org 2. www. catholic-resources. org 3. www. religion-online. org 4. Our book, â€Å"Art: A Brief History† by: Marilyn Stokstad